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Abstract. The voter model is a simple agent-based model to mimic opinion dynamics
in social networks: a randomly chosen agent adopts the opinion of a randomly chosen
neighbour. This process is repeated until a consensus emerges. Although the basic
voter model is theoretically intriguing, it misses an important feature of real opinion
dynamics: it does not distinguish between an agent’s publicly expressed opinion and
her inner conviction. A person may not feel comfortable declaring her conviction if
her social circle appears to hold an opposing view. Here we introduce the Concealed
Voter Model where we add a second, concealed layer of opinions to the public layer.
If an agent’s public and concealed opinions disagree, she can reconcile them by either
publicly disclosing her previously secret point of view or by accepting her public opinion
as inner conviction. We study a complete graph of agents who can choose from two
opinions. We define a martingale M that determines the probability of all agents
eventually agreeing on a particular opinion. By analyzing the evolution of M in the
limit of a large number of agents, we derive the leading-order terms for the mean and
standard deviation of the consensus time (i.e. the time needed until all opinions are
identical). We thereby give a precise prediction by how much concealed opinions slow
down a consensus.
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1. Introduction
The voter model, introduced in the 1970s [1, 2], has became a paradigmatic model
for the theoretical study of opinion dynamics [3, 4]. It describes the emergence of
an ordered state (e.g. a consensus) through the local interactions of individual agents
(e.g. voters). This phenomenon occurs in various contexts. Therefore, the original
voter model and its extended versions have been broadly applied not only in social
and political sciences [4, 5], but also in chemistry (e.g. in the study of catalytic
reactions [6]) and biology (e.g. for modelling ecological competition [7, 8, 9] and prey-
predator interaction [10]).
Most voter models share the features that
(i) each agent is in one state (e.g. has one particular opinion) out of two alternatives
and
(ii) the state can only be changed through pairwise interactions between agents.
(For exceptions from rules (i) and (ii), see [11] and [12], respectively.) In each interaction,
a focal agent is selected at random together with a randomly chosen adjacent agent.
The graph that describes the adjacency can be complete, regular (e.g. a square lattice)
or more complex (see examples in [13] and [14]). The focal agent can adopt or reject the
opinion of the adjacent agent. In the original version of the voter model, which we call
the Basic Voter Model (BVM), the rule of interaction is simple: the focal agent must
adopt the neighbour’s opinion.
The BVM on a finite, strongly connected graph (i.e. a graph in which there is a
directed path between every pair of agents) inevitably reaches a global consensus [15]
(i.e. an absorbing state in which every agent holds the same opinion). Various versions
of the model have applied more complex rules [4], some of which may not guarantee that
all agents ultimately share the same opinion. However, in this paper we only consider
models that must end in a consensus. In this context, an important question is how
long it takes until all agents agree. The consensus time (also called exit time, hitting
time or first-passage time) depends on the rules of interaction and graph structure [16].
In this article, we introduce a new kind of model, the Concealed Voter Model (CVM),
which differs from the BVM by distinguishing between an agent’s publicly expressed
opinion and her inner conviction about the particular subject. For this reason, we
add a second, concealed layer of opinions to the public layer (Figure 1). The duality
between inner conviction and publicly expressed opinion is an important phenomenon
in every society (see examples in [17]). To our knowledge, the first theoretical model
that explicitly considered this duality was the “partisan” voter model [18, 19]. Every
agent in that model is a “partisan” with a fixed and innate preference for one of the two
opinions, which influences the agent’s publicly expressed opinion. Thus, the partisan
model distinguishes between two layers, but the interaction between the layers is only
unidirectional: the internal opinion influences the external one, but the partisan voter
model does not contain any feedback mechanism from the external to the internal
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Figure 1. Example for the CVM in a small, complete network, with N = 6. Each
agent is represented by two nodes, one in the external and one in the internal layer. The
state of the agent marked by a yellow background is Rb; note that we use upper-case
letters for the external and lower-case letters for the internal opinions. The following
elementary events can happen to this agent: copying the external opinion of a randomly
selected agent (solid gray arrow); externalization (solid black arrow); or internalization
(dotted black arrow). The corresponding rates are c, e and i. The loops in the external
layer indicate that copying the agent’s own opinion is also among the options; in that
case, the agent keeps the original opinion.
opinion. The main novelty in the CVM is that it permits a bidirectional interaction
between both layers.
We compare the mean and the standard deviation of the consensus time in the BVM
and CVM. Thus, we investigate whether the existence of concealed opinions increases the
coexistence time of alternative opinions in a group of people and, if yes, to what extent.
In real societies, concealed opinions are ubiquitous on many kinds of issues [17], for
example on political votes, debated social norms or consumption habits. Understanding
the composition of opinions in the hidden layer, and how it influences the public, is
important for making reliable predictions about collective opinion formation.
2. The Basic and the Concealed Voter Model
Let N denote the number of agents in the system. In the BVM, the state of each
agent α at time t is defined as her publicly expressed opinion ωext(α, t). The subscript
“ext” emphasizes that this is an external opinion in the sense that any adjacent agent
can learn that α’s opinion is ωext(α, t). In our model, t is continuous and opinions are
updated asynchronously (see [20] for a discussion of differences between voter models
with synchronous and asynchronous updates). The opinion is binary. We denote the
options as red (R) or blue (B). The agent updates her opinion by selecting one of the
adjacent agents, say β, randomly and copying β’s opinion ωext(β, t). The time intervals
between two consecutive copying events by agent α are exponentially distributed with
a rate c. All time intervals are independent of each other so that the times between two
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successive copying events in a system composed of N agents is exponentially distributed
with a rate c·N .
In the CVM, the state of each agent is given by a pair of states (ωext(α, t), ωint(α, t)),
where ωext is the external and ωint the internal opinion (Figure 1). We denote the two
possible external opinions with a capital letter R or B, whereas the lower-case letter
r or b stands for her internal opinion. The agents’ four possible states are denoted
as Rr, Rb, Br and Bb. The rules of updating in the external layer are the same
as in the BVM. An additional process, that is specific to the CVM, is introspection.
When ωext(α, t) 6= ωint(α, t) (i.e. there is a discordance between the external and the
internal opinion), the agent can relax it by either of two processes: externalization,
whereby the formerly concealed internal state becomes public; or internalization, when
the publicly voiced opinion becomes an internal conviction. Altogether, there are
three competing processes in the system: copying, externalization, and internalization.
The time intervals between two consecutive events of each kind are independent and
exponentially distributed with rates c·N , e·N and i·N , respectively, in the group of N
agents. Copying other agents’ opinions promotes consensus within the external layer
whereas externalization and internalization advance consensus between the two layers.
In this article, we study the global outcome of these processes for large N in
complete graphs. Because complete graphs are strongly connected, the agents must
reach a consensus if N is finite. We include the reflexive relation (i.e. there is a loop
from an agent to herself) for mathematical convenience. For large N , the difference
between the dynamics with and without the self-loop is negligible. In the BVM, we
describe the state of the system at any given time t by the fraction ρR(t) of agents
whose opinion is red in the only (i.e. external) layer. In the CVM, we describe the state
by (i) ρR in the external layer, (ii) the fraction ρr of red opinions in the internal layer,
and (iii) the fraction ρRr of agents whose opinion is red in both layers. We study the
time evolution of these observables and examine the consensus time (i.e. the first time
when only a single opinion is present in both layers).
In section 3, we review some published results about the BVM concerning the
main statistical properties of the consensus time. In order to investigate the same
characteristics in the CVM, we first introduce an intermediate model in section 4 (the
Two-Layered Voter Model), in which we also assume the existence of two connected
layers. However, unlike in the CVM, the event ωext(α, t) = R is independent of
ωint(α, t) = r so that the equations are easier to solve. Finally, we show in section 5
that the CVM equations can be solved similarly.
3. The Basic Voter Model (BVM) on the complete graph
The mean consensus time of the BVM on the complete graph has been the subject of
earlier publications (e.g. [13, 21]). Here we briefly review these results and also state the
equation for higher moments of the consensus time distribution. We include this review
because the BVM acts as a base case for comparison with the CVM and motivates the
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analytic techniques we apply below.
We describe the state S of the system by the fraction ρR ∈ {0,
1
N
, . . . , N−1
N
, 1} of
agents whose opinion is red. The probability that the next copy increases ρR by
1
N
equals the product of the probability (1 − ρR) that the copying agent’s opinion is blue
and the probability ρR that the copied agent holds the red opinion. Because copying
events happen with rate cN , the transition rate from ρR to ρR +
1
N
is
QBVM
(
ρR, ρR +
1
N
)
= cNρR(1− ρR). (1)
Similarly, the rate with which ρR decreases to ρR −
1
N
is the product of the copy rate
cN , the probability ρR that the copying agent is red and the probability (1 − ρR) that
the copied opinion is blue,
QBVM
(
ρR, ρR −
1
N
)
= cNρR(1− ρR). (2)
A comparison between (1) and (2) reveals that both transition rates are in fact equal.
The probability that in one copy we increase or decrease ρR by more than
1
N
is
zero. The diagonal element Q(ρR, ρR) of a transition rate matrix Q is conventionally
defined as −
∑
x 6=ρR
Q(ρR, x). Therefore, the only nonzero matrix elements in the row
corresponding to state ρR are QBVM
(
ρR, ρR ±
1
N
)
and
QBVM(ρR, ρR) = −2cNρR(1− ρR). (3)
The relatively simple structure of QBVM allows us to verify that the state S(t) at
time t is a martingale,
E[S(t+ u) | S(t)] = S(t), (4)
where E[. . . | . . .] denotes the conditional expectation value and u is an arbitrary
nonnegative time. Equation (4) follows directly from the fact that
∑
x xQBVM(ρR, x) = 0
for all ρR. If we start a series of Monte Carlo simulations always from a fixed initial
fraction S(0) = s0 of red agents, the martingale property (4) manifests itself as follows.
As we increase the number of simulations, the sample mean of S(t) – averaged over
different simulations, but at a fixed t – converges to s0 although each individual run is
likely to differ from s0 [22].
We denote the consensus time by Tcons. For every realization, we can tell whether
Tcons = t is true without having to know any of the states at times > t. Therefore, in
the parlance of stochastic processes, Tcons is a “stopping time”. Because we also know
that S is a martingale with time-independent lower and upper bounds 0 and 1, we must
have E[S(Tcons)] = E[S(0)] (see [23]). Moreover, the only two possible states at Tcons
are either S(Tcons) = 1 (i.e. a red consensus) or S(Tcons) = 0 (i.e. a blue consensus) so
that the probability of a red consensus is given by the expected initial fraction E[S(0)]
of red agents. In the special case where all simulations start with S(0) = s0, we reach
a red consensus with probability s0.
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How long does it take on average to reach a consensus from s0? If we denote the
expected consensus time by
µ
(1)
BVM(s0) = E[Tcons | S(0) = s0],
where the superscript “(1)” indicates that the left-hand side is the first moment of the
conditional consensus time distribution, then µ
(1)
BVM must satisfy [23]∑
s0
QBVM(ρR, s0)µ
(1)
BVM(s0) = −1 for all ρR =
1
N
, . . . , N−1
N
, (5)
µ
(1)
BVM(0) = µ
(1)
BVM(1) = 0.
Inserting (1), (2) and (3) into (5), we obtain
cNρR(1− ρR)
[
µ
(1)
BVM
(
ρR −
1
N
)
− 2µ
(1)
BVM(ρR) + µ
(1)
BVM
(
ρR +
1
N
)]
= −1. (6)
We approximate µ
(1)
BVM by a smooth function and substitute its Taylor expansion into (6).
After dropping terms O(N−3), which are negligible if N ≫ 1, we obtain the differential
equation
d2
dρ2R
µ
(1)
BVM(ρR) = −
N
cρR(1− ρR)
. (7)
The solution is [13, 21]
µ
(1)
BVM(ρR) = −
N
c
· [ρR ln ρR + (1− ρR) ln(1− ρR)]. (8)
We can generalize this approach to higher moments of the consensus time. Let
µ
(n)
BVM(s0) denote the n-th moment of the consensus time conditioned on the initial state
s0,
µ
(n)
BVM(s0) = E [T
n
cons | S(0) = s0] .
With the method described in section 1.6.2.2 of Ref. [21], one can obtain the following
generalization of (7),
d2
dρ2R
µ
(n)
BVM(ρR) = −
nN
c
µ
(n−1)
BVM (ρR)
ρR(1− ρR)
. (9)
For the second moment, in particular, we find the following result that we have not seen
explicitly stated in the previous literature,
µ
(2)
BVM(ρR) = (10)
2N2
c2
[
ρR ln ρR + (1− ρR) ln(1− ρR)− ρRLi2(ρR)− (1− ρR)Li2(1− ρR) +
pi2
6
]
,
where Li2 is the dilogarithm.
Our objective is to compare the mean µ
(1)
BVM(s0) and the standard deviation
σBVM(s0) =
√
µ
(2)
BVM(s0)−
[
µ
(1)
BVM(s0)
]2
(11)
of the BVM consensus time with those of the CVM. We will derive that, for N ≫ 1,
the CVM’s mean and standard deviation differ by a factor that depends on the rates of
copying, externalization and internalization. We will give the explicit equation (31) for
this factor below.
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4. An intermediate, two-layered voter model (TLVM)
4.1. Motivating and defining the TLVM
The CVM is more complicated than the BVM because we need more than one variable
to describe its state. The agents can have four possible combinations of external and
internal opinions (Rr, Rb, Br and Bb). Because the sum of agents in these four states
is constrained by the total number N of all agents, the state space in the CVM is three-
dimensional. We can, for example, choose the following set of variables to uniquely
characterize the current state,
• ρR: fraction of agents whose external opinion is red (i.e. Rr and Rb agents),
• ρr: fraction of agents whose internal opinion is red (i.e. Rr and Br agents),
• ρRr: fraction of Rr agents.
In the CVM, the events ωext(α, t) = R (i.e. agent α’s external opinion at time t is red)
and ωint(α, t) = r (i.e. her internal opinion is red) generally depend on each other.
That is, P [ωext(α, t) = R, ωint(α, t) = r] = ρRr(t) 6= ρR(t)ρr(t). As we will show below,
we can calculate the leading-order term of the CVM consensus time for N ≫ 1, but
the inequality ρRr(t) 6= ρR(t)ρr(t) complicates the solution. For this reason, we will
first solve a simplified model where we ignore the dependence between the external and
internal layer, i.e. we set ρRr(t) = ρR(t)ρr(t). We include the simpler model in this
article because it demonstrates, with fewer intermediate steps, the analytic techniques
that we will apply later to the CVM. Although the model does not yet fully capture
the CVM dynamics, we will still be able to transfer some of the results directly to the
CVM.
As in the CVM, we still distinguish between an external and an internal layer of
opinions and, therefore, call this model the Two-Layered Voter Model (TLVM). We keep
two of the CVM’s features.
• Each agent copies the external opinion of a random agent with rate c.
• There is no direct opinion exchange in the internal layer.
We can impose the condition ρRr(t) = ρR(t)ρr(t) by introducing links between all N
2
pairs formed by one external and one internal opinion.
• With rate e
N
, every pair externalizes (i.e. the internal opinion becomes the external
opinion).
• With rate i
N
, each pair internalizes.
We divide e and i by N so that the mean time between externalization and
internalization events is equal in the TLVM and CVM. We list all transitions in the
TLVM together with their rates in Table 1.
Similar to the BVM, the TLVM possesses a martingale, albeit a slightly more
complex one. We define the function
m(ρR, ρr) =
iρR + eρr
e + i
, (12)
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Table 1. Transitions from the state (ρR, ρr) in the TLVM and their rates.
How is the new Transition rate matrix element
New state (x, y) state reached? QTLVM[(ρR, ρr), (x, y)](
ρR +
1
N
, ρr
)
A B agent copies a neighbour cNρR(1− ρR) + eN(1 − ρR)ρr
with external opinion R or
a Br pair externalizes.(
ρR −
1
N
, ρr
)
An R agent copies a neighbour cNρR(1− ρR) + eNρR(1− ρr)
with external opinion B or
an Rb pair externalizes.(
ρR, ρr +
1
N
)
An Rb pair internalizes. iNρR(1− ρr)(
ρR, ρr −
1
N
)
A Br pair internalizes. iN(1 − ρR)ρr
(ρR, ρr) Negative sum of all rates −2cNρR(1− ρR)+
above. (e+ i)N(2ρRρr − ρR − ρr)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
ρr
ρR
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
t
Figure 2. An example trajectory for the TLVM with N = 200, c = 1, e = 0.25 and
i = 0.0625. We plot the state of the system after every 10th update. In the initial phase
(brown dots), the state moves rapidly towards the diagonal line ρR = ρr. Afterwards
the system stays near the diagonal until it reaches one of the two consensus states in
the lower left and upper right corners of the square. As N gets larger, the state stays
closer to the diagonal.
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which maps the two-dimensional input (ρR, ρr) onto a real number in [0, 1]. We can view
m as the relative proportion of the red opinion that is present in the combination of the
external and internal layer, prorated by the weights i
e+i
and e
e+i
, respectively. Let SR(t)
be the random variable that equals the fraction of R agents.‡ Similarly, Sr(t) equals the
fraction of r agents. We show in Lemma A.1 in the appendix that m[SR(t), Sr(t)] is a
martingale. In the appendix, we also prove a corollary of this lemma (Corollary A.2):
if the initial state is SR(0) = ρR and Sr(0) = ρr, then the probability of reaching a red
consensus is m(ρR, ρr). As we will see shortly, m[SR(t), Sr(t)] is a convenient summary
statistic to derive the time needed to reach a consensus.
4.2. The consensus time in the TLVM
Suppose we are in the state SR(t) = ρR, Sr(t) = ρr at time t. What can we infer
about the state at a later time t + u? In Appendix B, we prove the following property
(Theorem B.1): after a transient of duration O[(e + i)−1], SR(t + u) approximately
equals Sr(t + u). If e and i are independent of N , the relative error we commit by the
approximation SR ≈ Sr is negligible if N ≫ 1 because the consensus time turns out
to be O(N) (see equation 13). In other words, we can separate two time scales. On a
fast time scale, the expected value of SR − Sr quickly decays to zero. On a slow time
scale, the system diffuses along the line ρR = ρr towards one of the absorbing states.
In Figure 2, we show a typical run of the TLVM that confirms this conjecture. We
calculated the data shown in Figure 2 and all other numerical results in this article with
the Gillespie algorithm, an exact implementation of the stochastic dynamics [24].
Because the TLVM spends most of the time in states with SR ≈ Sr, we can
approximately describe the dynamics in terms of the one-dimensional random variable
M = m[SR(t), Sr(t)], where m is the function defined in (12). In this simplified picture,
we use the symbol Q˜TLVM for the transition rate matrix. The nonzero elements of Q˜TLVM
are
Q˜TLVM
(
m,m+
i
(e + i)N
)
= Q˜TLVM
(
m,m−
i
(e+ i)N
)
= (c+ e)Nm(1 −m),
Q˜TLVM
(
m,m+
e
(e + i)N
)
= Q˜TLVM
(
m,m−
e
(e+ i)N
)
= iNm(1 −m),
Q˜TLVM(m,m) = −2(c+ e+ i)Nm(1 −m),
which we can derive by substituting (12) into the transition rates in Table 1.
In analogy to the BVM, we define the mean consensus time in the TLVM as
µ
(1)
TLVM(m0) = E[Tcons |M(0) = m0].
It must satisfy the equivalent of (5),∑
m0
Q˜TLVM(m,m0)µ
(1)
TLVM(m0) = −1
‡ SR should not be confused with ρR. SR is the function that maps a stochastic configuration of
opinions to the fraction ρR of red external opinions. Thus, SR is a random variable whereas ρR is a
number between 0 and 1.
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for all m = iNR+eNr
N(e+i)
with NR, Nr ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} and m /∈ {0, 1}. As in the BVM, we
Taylor expand µ
(1)
TLVM to second order and obtain the differential equation
d2
dm2
µ
(1)
TLVM(m) = −
(e+ i)2N
i[(c+ e)i+ e2]
·
1
m(1−m)
.
The solution, subject to the boundary conditions µ
(1)
TLVM(0) = µ
(1)
TLVM(1) = 0, is
µ
(1)
TLVM(m) = −
(e + i)2N
i[(c + e)i+ e2]
· [m lnm+ (1−m) ln(1−m)] . (13)
The calculation of the higher moments of the consensus time
µ
(n)
TLVM = E [T
n
cons |M(0) = m0]
is similar to (10) in the BVM. Induction on n shows that
µ
(n)
TLVM(m) =
(
c(e + i)2
i[(c+ e)i+ e2]
)n
µ
(n)
BVM(m).
Because m ≈ ρR ≈ ρr, the dynamics of the external and internal opinions both behave
like BVMs, but with a time that is rescaled by a factor
τTLVM(c, e, i) =
c(e + i)2
i[(c+ e)i+ e2]
. (14)
In particular, the standard deviations of TLVM and BVM are related by
σTLVM(m) = τTLVM(c, e, i)σBVM(m). (15)
In Figure 3, we show, as a numerical confirmation of (13) and (15), the mean and
standard deviation of the TLVM consensus time obtained from Monte Carlo simulations.
The numerical results are in excellent agreement with the theoretical predictions (i.e.
the finite size effect at N = 1000 does not modify the results substantially).
There are four main conclusions from the TLVM that we will be able to transfer to
the CVM. (1) Although the state space is two-dimensional, the system spends most of
the time near the one-dimensional manifold ρR = ρr. (2) We can express the position
along this manifold in terms of a function m that has the property that m(SR, Sr) is a
martingale. (3) After expressing the transition rate matrix in terms of m, we can derive
the moments of the TLVM consensus time distribution. (4) The TLVM moments are
related to those of the BVM by µ
(n)
TLVM = τTLVM(c, e, i)
nµ
(n)
BVM for a scale factor τTLVM
that is independent of n. We will encounter similar rules in the CVM.
5. Solving the Concealed Voter Model (CVM)
5.1. Short-term evolution of the states in the CVM
In the CVM, we denote the random variables that map a stochastic configuration at
time t to the fractions ρR, ρr and ρRr (defined in section 4.1) by SR(t), Sr(t) and
SRr(t) respectively. Compared to the TLVM, the CVM not only has a three- instead
of a two-dimensional state space, but the transition rate matrix QCVM also has more
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0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
ρR
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
ρr
(a) (b)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
µ
(1)
TLVM
m
c=1, e=0.25, i=0.0625
c=1, e=0.0625, i=0.25
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
σTLVM
m
c=1, e=0.25, i=0.0625
c=1, e=0.0625, i=0.25
Figure 3. The consensus time in the TLVM as a function of the initial value of
m (defined in equation 12): (a) the mean µ
(1)
TLVM, and (b) the standard deviation
σTLVM. Triangles and circles indicate numerical results from Monte Carlo simulations
for two different combinations of c, e and i. The symbol colour represents the value
of ρR, the symbol size the value of ρr. For some values of m, we include results from
two combinations of ρR and ρr. The symbols are larger than the error bars in several
cases. The system size for all simulations is N = 1000. The curves show the theoretical
predictions from equation (13) in panel (a) and from equation (15) in panel (b).
nonzero elements (listed in Table 2). Despite the added complexity, some of the
TLVM results remain unchanged for the CVM. In particular, the TLVM martingale
M(t) = m(SR(t), Sr(t)), where m is defined in equation (12), is also a martingale of the
CVM (see Lemma A.1 in the appendix). Moreover, as in the TLVM, m(ρR, ρr) equals
the probability of reaching a red consensus if the initial condition satisfies SR(0) = ρR
and Sr(0) = ρr (see Corollary A.2). Curiously, m does not depend on ρRr. If we arrange
the four possible combinations of external and internal opinions Rr, Rb, Br and Bb
in a 2 × 2 contingency table, the marginal frequencies ρR and ρr fully determine the
probability that all agents ultimately agree with the red opinion. The joint distribution
of internal and external opinions, which can be derived with the help of ρRr, does not
add more information about the probable consensus opinion.
Besides identical martingales, the TLVM and the CVM also have equations (B.1)–
(B.4) in common (see Theorem B.1 in the appendix). We can deduce from (B.1)–(B.4)
that, after a transient of duration O[(e+i)−1], the state (SR, Sr, SRr) of the CVM satisfies
SR ≈ Sr ≈ m(SR, Sr). If e and i are independent of N and N ≫ 1, the transient is
negligible compared to the consensus time so that we can approximate the dynamics of
the CVM with a simplified two-dimensional state space. Upon setting ρR = ρr = m,
the matrix elements in Table 2 become
Q˜CVM
[
(m, ρRr),
(
m+
i
N(e + i)
, ρRr +
1
N
)]
= cNm(m− ρRr) + eN(m− ρRr), (16)
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Table 2. Transitions from the state (ρR, ρr, ρRr) in the CVM and their rates.
How is the new Transition rate matrix element
New state (x, y, z) state reached? QCVM[(ρR, ρr, ρRr), (x, y, z)](
ρR +
1
N
, ρr, ρRr +
1
N
)
A Br agent externalizes cNρR(ρr − ρRr) + eN(ρr − ρRr)
or copies a neighbour
with external opinion R.(
ρR, ρr +
1
N
, ρRr +
1
N
)
An Rb agent internalizes. iN(ρR − ρRr)(
ρR −
1
N
, ρr, ρRr −
1
N
)
An Rr agent copies a cNρRr(1− ρR)
neighbour with external
opinion B.(
ρR +
1
N
, ρr, ρRr
)
A Bb agent copies a cN(1− ρR − ρr + ρRr)ρR
neighbour with external
opinion R.(
ρR −
1
N
, ρr, ρRr
)
An Rb agent externalizes cN(ρR − ρRr)(1− ρR)+
or copies a neighbour eN(ρR − ρRr)
with external opinion B.(
ρR, ρr −
1
N
, ρRr
)
A Br agent internalizes. iN(ρr − ρRr)
(ρR, ρr, ρRr) Negative sum of all rates −2cNρR(1− ρR)+
above. (e+ i)N(2ρRr − ρR − ρr)
Q˜CVM
[
(m, ρRr),
(
m+
e
N(e + i)
, ρRr +
1
N
)]
= iN(m− ρRr), (17)
Q˜CVM
[
(m, ρRr),
(
m−
i
N(e + i)
, ρRr −
1
N
)]
= cNρRr(1−m), (18)
Q˜CVM
[
(m, ρRr),
(
m+
i
N(e + i)
, ρRr
)]
= cN(1− 2m+ ρRr)m, (19)
Q˜CVM
[
(m, ρRr),
(
m−
i
N(e + i)
, ρRr
)]
= cN(m− ρRr)(1−m) + eN(m− ρRr), (20)
Q˜CVM
[
(m, ρRr),
(
m−
e
N(e + i)
, ρRr
)]
= iN(m− ρRr), (21)
Q˜CVM[(m, ρRr), (m, ρRr)] = −2cNm(1 −m) + 2(e+ i)N(ρRr −m). (22)
With this two-dimensional approximation of QCVM, we can deduce the short-term
evolution of SRr (see Theorem B.2 in the appendix): after a transient that lasts no longer
than O[(c+ e+ i)−1], the states in the CVM satisfy ρR ≈ ρr ≈ m and ρRr ≈
cm2+(e+i)m
c+e+i
.
We show a typical trajectory of a CVM simulation in Figure 4 that confirms this
approximation.
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Figure 4. An example trajectory for the CVM with N = 200, c = 1, e = 0.25 and
i = 0.0625. We plot the state of the system after every 10th update. Similar to the
TLVM dynamics in Figure 2, the system moves in the initial phase (brown dots) rapidly
towards a one-dimensional curve (black) that connects the two consensus states, which
in the CVM are ρR = ρr = ρRr = 0 or ρR = ρr = ρRr = 1 at opposite ends of the
cube. The parametric equations for the curve are ρR = ρr = m and ρRr =
cm
2+(e+i)m
c+e+i
for m ∈ [0, 1]. After the initial drift, the system stays in the vicinity of this curve until
it reaches one of the consensus states.
5.2. The consensus time in the CVM
Figure 4 demonstrates that we can neglect the transient (i.e. the initial approach towards
the black curve) compared to the consensus time. We can thus approximate the CVM
dynamics by a one-dimensional model whose transition rate matrix follows from setting
ρRr =
cm2+(e+i)m
c+e+i
in (16)–(22),
≈
QCVM
(
m,m+
i
(e + i)N
)
=
≈
QCVM
(
m,m−
i
(e+ i)N
)
(23)
= c
(
1 +
e
c+ e + i
)
Nm(1−m),
≈
QCVM
(
m,m+
e
(e + i)N
)
=
≈
QCVM
(
m,m−
e
(e+ i)N
)
=
ciNm(1 −m)
c + e+ i
, (24)
≈
QCVM (m,m) = −2c
(
1 +
e+ i
c+ e + i
)
Nm(1−m). (25)
We use a double tilde in the symbol Q˜CVM for the transition rate matrix to express
that (23)–(25) are approximations of Q˜CVM, which in turn is an approximation of the
exact CVM transition rate matrix QCVM given by Table 2. The relative error that we
introduce with these approximations is negligible if N ≫ 1.
With the one-dimensional approximation Q˜CVM, the derivation of the mean
consensus time is now analogous to that of the TLVM in section 4.2. We call the
mean CVM consensus time
µ
(1)
CVM(m0) = E[Tcons |M(0) = m0]
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so that ∑
m0
≈
QCVM (m,m0)µ
(1)
CVM(m0) = −1 (26)
if m /∈ {0, 1} and
µ
(1)
CVM(0) = µ
(1)
CVM(1) = 0. (27)
Upon inserting (23)–(25) into (26) and taking the continuum limit, we obtain the
differential equation
d2
dm2
µ
(1)
CVM(m) = −
(c + e+ i)(e + i)2N
ci[ci+ (e+ i)2]
·
1
m(1−m)
.
The solution, subject to the boundary condition (27), is
µ
(1)
CVM(m) = −
(c + e+ i)(e + i)2N
ci[(e + i)2 + ci]
· [m lnm+ (1−m) ln(1−m)]. (28)
Comparing (28) with the BVM mean consensus time in (8), we find that
µ
(1)
CVM(m) =
(c+ e + i)(e+ i)2
i[(e + i)2 + ci]
· µ
(1)
BVM(m),
which generalizes to the higher moments as
µ
(n)
CVM(m) =
(
(c+ e+ i)(e + i)2
i[(e+ i)2 + ci]
)n
µ
(n)
BVM(m). (29)
It follows that the standard deviation of the consensus time obeys
σCVM(m) =
(c+ e + i)(e+ i)2
i[(e + i)2 + ci]
· σBVM(m), (30)
where σBVM can be calculated from (10) and (11). Monte Carlo simulations of the CVM
are in excellent agreement with equations (28) and (30), see Figure 5.
Equation (29) has the remarkable consequence that the CVM consensus time
distribution differs from that of the BVM only by the prefactor
τCVM(c, e, i) =
(c+ e+ i)(e + i)2
i[(e+ i)2 + ci]
. (31)
We plot the function τCVM in Figure 6. Interestingly, τCVM(c, e, i) > 1 for all c, e and i
for the following reason. Because c, e and i are rates and hence positive numbers, we
must have
0 < c < c+ e and 0 < i2 < (e + i)2
⇒ 0 < ci2 < (c+ e)(e+ i)2.
Next we add i(e+ i)2 to the last two terms in the inequality,
0 < i[(e+ i)2 + ci] < (c+ e+ i)(e + i)2.
Hence, the denominator in (31) is positive and smaller than the numerator, proving
τCVM(c, e, i) > 1. By contrast, the corresponding TLVM scale factor τTLVM, given by
equation (14), can be larger or smaller than 1.
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Figure 5. (a) The mean consensus time µ
(1)
CVM of the CVM and (b) the standard
deviation σCVM as a function of m. As in Figure 3, triangles and circles are Monte
Carlo results for two different combinations of c, e and i. The symbol colour specifies
ρR, the symbol size ρr. We also include results for different ρRr so that there are
multiple measurements for a given value of m. The symbols are larger than the error
bars in several cases. The system size for all simulations is N = 1000. The theoretical
predictions from equations (28) and (30) are shown as black curves.
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Figure 6. The factor τCVM by which the mean CVM consensus time µ
(1)
CVM is
prolonged compared to the BVM. Because τCVM only depends on
e
c
and i
c
(see
equation 31), we use these ratios for the coordinate axes. The delay is especially
severe when e is large and i is small. In this region, agents tend to be candid about
their internal opinions towards the public and they maintain their internal opinions
for a long time. In the limit i→ 0 and e→∞, the CVM is similar to the zealot model
by Mobilia et al. [25], see our discussion in section 6.
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6. Discussion
Having concealed opinions is ubiquitous on various subjects from politics to personal
habits. An agent may choose to misrepresent her privately held opinion when it appears
to be socially unacceptable. For example, the agent may disapprove of the latest fashion
trend, but still adopt it just to blend in with her acquaintances. Kuran [17] argues that
such preference falsification can slow down changes in social norms. The CVM is a
simple model to investigate whether the existence of concealed opinions indeed prolongs
the consensus time and, if yes, to what extent.
Our study is related to earlier models on “partisan” voters [18, 19]. Partisans
have an innate and fixed preference for one of the opinions. In the limit i → 0, the
CVM resembles the partisan model: although agents externally accept other opinions,
the internal layer never changes. Models with “zealot” agents (also called stubborn or
inflexible agents [25, 26, 27]) are even more restrictive. Zealots are agents that never
change their opinions. In these models, typically only a small number of agents are
zealots, but even as few as two zealots with opposite opinions are enough to prevent a
consensus. In the limiting case i → 0 and e → ∞, the CVM corresponds to a zealot
model so that the consensus time goes to infinity. This explains the high values of
τCVM(c, e, i) in the front left corner of Figure 6.
The partisan model permits the flow of opinions from the internal to the external
layer, but only in this direction. In the CVM, the flow is bidirectional (provided that
i > 0 and e > 0) so that agents can hold contrarian opinions for long but not infinite
times. The longer an agent has been holding an external opinion, the more likely it
is that she has adopted it as an internal one. Thereby, the CVM takes into account
Kuran’s remark that social norms can become genuinely accepted simply because they
have persisted for a long time.
A characteristic feature of the CVM is that, for all externalization and
internalization rates, the consensus is on average slower than in the BVM. Masuda
et al. [18] have shown that one way to slow down the convergence to consensus in the
BVM is the introduction of heterogeneous copying rates. In their model, each agent
k has a different copying rate ck chosen from a heavy-tailed probability distribution.
The CVM gives an alternative mechanism for the prolongation of the consensus time.
It keeps the assumption of homogeneity as in the original BVM (i.e. neither c nor e
nor i depend on the agent). The deceleration in the CVM is instead caused by the
requirement to reconcile the two layers with each other. The process that leads to
reconciliation is fairly complex. Even when the external layer has reached an apparent
consensus, the alternative opinion may lurk in the internal layer. This model feature in
itself prolongs the consensus time. However, the main reason for the slower consensus
is that the lurking opinion can come to the fore by externalization and then spread by
copying, returning the system to a state of discord in the external layer.
In spite of this complexity, we were able to find some simple relations for a complete
graph if N ≫ 1. We defined a martingale M that determines the probability that the
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agents eventually agree on one opinion (“red”) rather than the alternative (“blue”). By
analyzing the stochastic dynamics of M , we obtained the leading-order terms for the
mean and standard deviation of the consensus time. Notably, the consensus times in
the CVM only differ from the BVM by a factor τCVM(c, e, i) > 1 that is independent of
N . It would be an interesting task for future research to study how different network
topologies (e.g. Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs or spatial lattices) or heterogeneity in the rates c,
e, and i change the consensus time in the CVM.
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Appendix A. Derivation of the probability of a red consensus
We want to calculate the probability that all agents finally agree on the red opinion.
The crucial step is to find a suitable martingale.
Lemma A.1. The random variable M(t) = iSR+eSr
e+i
is a martingale of both the TLVM
and CVM. That is, M satisfies
E[M(t + u) | S(t)] = M(t) (A.1)
for any u ≥ 0, where S(t) is the state at time t,
S(t) =
{
[SR(t), Sr(t)] for the TLVM,
[SR(t), Sr(t), SRr(t)] for the CVM.
(A.2)
Proof. Let Q be the transition rate matrix QTLVM or QCVM, respectively. Because S is
a Markov chain with transition rate matrix Q, we must have
P [S(t+ u) = x | S(t) = s] = [exp(uQ)]s,x, (A.3)
where the right-hand side is the (s, x)-th element in the matrix exp(uQ). Hence,
E[M(t + u)−M(t) | S(t) = s] =
∑
x
[exp(uQ)− 1]s,xm(x), (A.4)
where 1 is the identity matrix andm is defined by (12). Next we take the time derivative
of (A.4),
d
du
E[M(t + u)−M(t) | S(t) = s] =
∑
x
[exp(uQ)Q]s,xm(x)
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=
∑
y
[exp(uQ)]s,y
∑
x
Q(y, x)m(x).
If we can show∑
x
Q(y, x)m(x) = 0 (A.5)
for all states y = (ρR, ρr) in the TLVM and y = (ρR, ρr, ρRr) in the CVM, then
E[M(t + u) − M(t) | S(t) = s] is independent of u so that (A.1) must be true. We
can verify (A.5) by substituting the elements of QTLVM or QCVM from Table 1 or 2,
respectively, into (A.5).
The probability of a red consensus now follows from the following corollary.
Corollary A.2. If the initial state is
S(0) =
{
(ρR, ρr) in the TLVM,
(ρR, ρr, ρRr) in the CVM,
then the probability of reaching a red consensus is m(ρR, ρr), where m is defined by (12).
Proof. The time Tcons until the consensus is reached is a stopping time and M is a
martingale with time-independent upper and lower bounds, namely 0 and 1. Thus,
E[M(Tcons)] = E[M(0)]. Because M(Tcons) can only be 0 (blue consensus) or 1 (red
consensus), we must have P (red consensus) = EM(Tcons) = EM(0) = m(ρR, ρr).
Appendix B. Derivation of the short-term evolution of the TLVM and
CVM
In this appendix, we derive the conditional mean and variance of a future state shortly
after the system was in state S defined by (A.2).
Theorem B.1. We define s = (ρR, ρr) in the TLVM and s = (ρR, ρr, ρRr) in the CVM.
In both the TLVM and the CVM, the conditional expectation of a future state after a
time u ≥ 0 is given by
E [SR(t + u) | S(t) = s] =
iρR + eρr + e[ρR − ρr] exp[−(e + i)u]
e + i
, (B.1)
E [Sr(t+ u) | S(t) = s] =
iρR + eρr + i[ρr − ρR] exp[−(e + i)u]
e+ i
, (B.2)
independent of N , whereas the conditional variances satisfy
var [SR(t+ u) | S(t) = s] = O(N
−1), (B.3)
var [Sr(t+ u) | S(t) = s] = O(N
−1). (B.4)
Therefore, if N ≫ 1, the exponential decay in (B.1) and (B.2) is much faster than the
increase in the variances.
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Proof. We outline the proof of (B.1). Equations (B.2)–(B.4) can be derived similarly.
From (A.3), it follows that the conditional expectation is
E[SR(t+ u) | S(t) = s] =
∑
x
xR[exp(uQ)]s,x
=
∞∑
k=0
{
uk
k!
∑
x
xRQ
k(s, x)
}
, (B.5)
where Q is the transition rate matrix QTLVM or QCVM from Table 1 or 2, respectively.
The summation in (B.5) is over all states x = (xR, xr) in the TLVM or x = (xR, xr, xRr)
in the CVM. Induction on k proves that∑
x
xRQ
k(s, x) = (−1)k−1e(e + i)k−1(ρr − ρR), (B.6)
for k = 1, 2, . . . Substituting (B.6) into (B.5), we obtain
E[SR(t+ u) | S(t) = s] = ρR +
e(ρR − ρr)
e + i
∞∑
k=1
uk
k!
(−1)k(e + i)k
=
iρR + eρr + e(ρR − ρr) exp[−(e + i)u]
e + i
.
Our next result characterizes the short-term evolution of SRr in the two-dimensional
approximation of the CVM defined by the transition rate matrix Q˜CVM given by
equations (16)–(22). Because in this approximation SR = Sr, it is sufficient to
characterize the state S = (SR, Sr, SRr) by two values: the value of m defined in Eq. 12
and the value of ρRr assumed by the random variable SRr.
Theorem B.2. The conditional expectation of SRr satisfies
E[SRr(t+ u) | S(t) = (m, ρRr)] (B.7)
=
cm2 + (e + i)m
c + e+ i
+
(
ρRr −
cm2 + (e+ i)m
c+ e + i
)
exp[−(c + e+ i)u] +O(N−1).
Thus, in the limit of large N , the conditional expectation approaches cm
2+(e+i)m
c+e+i
after a
transient of duration O[(c+ e+ i)−1]. The conditional variance satisfies
var[SRr(t+ u) | S(t) = (m, ρRr)] = O(N
−1)
so that, during the transient, the increase in the conditional variance is negligible if
N ≫ 1.
Proof. One can show by induction on k that∑
(xm,xRr)
xamxRr(Q˜CVM)
k[(m, ρRr), (xm, xRr)] =
(−1)k−1(c+ e+ i)k−1ma[cm2 + (e + i)m− (c+ e+ i)ρRr] +O(N
−1)
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for all nonnegative integers a and k = 1, 2, . . . For the special case a = 0, it follows that
E[SRr(t+ u) | S(t) = (m, ρRr)] =
∞∑
k=0
ukk! ∑
(xm,xRr)
xRr(Q˜CVM)
k[(m, ρRr), (xm, xRr)]

= ρRr −
cm2 + (e+ i)m− (c+ e + i)ρRr
c+ e+ i
∞∑
k=1
[−(c+ e + i)u]k
k!
+O(N−1)
= ρRr +
(
ρRr −
cm2 + (e+ i)m
c+ e + i
)
[exp(−(c+ e + i)u)− 1] +O(N−1). (B.8)
Rearranging the terms in (B.8) proves (B.7). A similar argument proves that the
conditional variance is O(N−1).
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